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Abstract
Behavior of malware varies concerning the malware types, which affects
the strategies of the system protection software. Many malware classifi-
cation models, empowered by machine and/or deep learning, achieve su-
perior accuracies for predicting malware types. Machine learning-based
models need to do heavy feature engineering work, which affects the per-
formance of the models greatly. On the other hand, deep learning-based
models require less effort in feature engineering when compared to that
of the machine learning-based models. However, traditional deep learn-
ing architectures components, such as max and average pooling, cause
architecture to be more complex and the models to be more sensitive
to data. The capsule network architectures, on the other hand, reduce
the aforementioned complexities by eliminating the pooling components.
Additionally, capsule network architectures based models are less sensi-
tive to data, unlike the classical convolutional neural network architec-
tures. This paper proposes an ensemble capsule network model based
on the bootstrap aggregating technique. The proposed method is tested
on two widely used, highly imbalanced datasets (Malimg and BIG2015),
for which the-state-of-the-art results are well-known and can be used
for comparison purposes. RCNF achieves the highest F-Score, which
is 0.9820, for the BIG2015 dataset and F-Score, which is 0.9661, for the
Malimg dataset. RCNF reaches the-state-of-the-art with fewer trainable
parameters than other competitors.
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1. Introduction
Malware type classification is as important as malware detection prob-
lem because system protection software makes their strategies concern-
ing malware family types. Malware families have different behaviors and
effects on a computer system. Each malware family uses different re-
sources, files, ports, and other components of operating systems. For
example, malware in the online banking systems aim to perform fraud,
steal private information of users, and use different spreading behaviors
[1, 2]. In addition to this, due to the trends in technology, new malware
types occur almost daily. Thus, most of the computers, smartphones, and
other digital systems are vulnerable to new malware. In this case, many
zero-day attacks are performed [3]. The raising of the number of malware
makes using the big data techniques crucial for malware analysis [4].
Malware type classification is the most common problem in the cy-
bersecurity domain, because strategies of protection systems vary with
respect to malware family type. Malware type classification problem is
broadly dealt with in three different ways: static, dynamic, and image-
based [5, 6, 7]. This paper focuses on the image-based malware family
classification problem. However, malware family type classification is an
imbalanced task, so this makes many models unsuccessful at predicting
rare classes. To this end, two imbalanced datasets are used and the results
are compared to other models in the literature.
This paper proposes a new model named Random Capsule Network
Forest (RCNF) based on bootstrap aggregation (bagging) ensemble tech-
nique and capsule network (CapsNet) [8, 9]. The main motive behind the
proposed method is to reduce the variance of different CapsNet models
(as weak learners) using bagging. In this perspective, the main contribu-
tions of this paper can be listed as follows:
• The paper introduces the first application of CapsNet in the field of
malware type classification. Although image-based malware classi-
fication is a broad research and application area, there is no research
and application of CapsNet in the literature in our best knowledge.
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• The paper uses the first ensemble model of CapsNet. The key idea
of creating an ensemble of CapsNet is assuming a single CapsNet
model as a weak classifier like a decision tree model. In this way, an
ensemble model of CapsNet can be easily created using bootstrap
aggregating. The assumption that CapsNet is a weak learner in-
creases the performance of a single CapsNet for two different well-
known malware datasets, which are highly imbalanced.
• The proposed model uses simple architecture engineering instead
of complex convolutional neural network architectures and domain-
specific feature engineering techniques. In addition to this, CapsNet
does not require to use transfer learning, and the model is easily
trained from scratch. Because of that, the created network and its
ensemble version have reasonably a lower the number of parame-
ters.
• The proposed model is compared with the latest studies that use
deep neural networks for image-based malware classification tasks.
For a fair comparison, especially, the last studies using the Malimg
and the BIG2015 datasets are chosen and compared with the pro-
posed method.
Image-based malware classification is a broad research and application
area. At the same time, deep learning drives the computer vision and
image processing researches. Many deep convolutional neural networks
have proven their success in image processing. CapsNet is the most im-
portant deep convolutional neural architecture that removes pooling to
avoid losing the spatial features of images. This is the power of Cap-
sNet comparing to classical CNNs. Therefore, the number of applications
of CapsNet is increasing in image processing. The main motivation of
this paper is to design a simple and accurate classifier for imbalanced
malware type classification problem using bagging [8, 10] and CapsNet
architecture. This paper also presents a detailed comparison of the pro-
posed model with the other models in the literature.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature sur-
vey for CapsNet applications and previous malware analysis studies. The
methodology of the paper is described in Section 3, whereas Section 4
gives details of the inspiring model and the proposed model. In Section
5, the test results are discussed and many comparisons with related works
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published in the last years are listed; and finally, Section 6 provides the
concluding remarks.
2. Related Work
There are many different ways to represent malware files for machine
learning-based identification. One of them is to extract features from the
application programming interface (API) calls of malware. For example,
Alazab [11] proposed a framework to get features statically and dynam-
ically from malware API calls. He used similarity mining and machine
learning to profile and classify malware. He obtained a 0.966 received-
operating-curve (ROC) score in the malware dataset containing 66, 703
samples (Malign or Benign) with the k-nearest neighbor algorithm. More-
over, Azab et al. [12] focused on grouping malware in the same variants
using hashing techniques for malware binaries. They used two different
Zeus datasets. The first dataset contained 856 binaries, and the second
dataset contained 22 binaries. Each binary had SHA256 value. They
achieved 0.999 F-Score using the k-nearest neighbors and SDHASH.
The second efficient way to feed machine learning algorithms to clas-
sify malware files is image-based representation. In this work, we have fo-
cused on image-based malware type classification. For example, Nataraj
et al. [13] converted malware files to greyscale images to represent mal-
ware. They extracted GIST features from malware images, and then they
classified malware family types, using the euclidean k-nearest neighbors
algorithm. They reached 0.98 classification accuracy for the dataset that
has 9339 samples and 25 malware families. Similarly, Kancherla et al.
[14] used image-based malware representation to feed the support vec-
tor machine to classify malware files malign or benign. They extracted
three different features, such as intensity-based, wavelet-based, and Ga-
bor based. Their dataset contained 15, 000 malign and 12, 000 benign sam-
ples. They attained 0.979 ROC score. These studies utilized traditional
machine learning algorithms, such as k-nearest neighbors, and the sup-
port vector machines. These algorithms required to extract good features
from images to classify malware types with a high performance. After an
impactful success of a deep convolutional neural network (CNN) on the
Imagenet dataset, a new era started in computer vision [15]. CNNs could
classify images using raw pixel values without complex feature engineer-
ing methods.
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Image-based malware classification is a broad research area, which
is affected by deep convolutional networks. In this regard, one of the
most important applications of CNNs is the transfer learning, which is
useful and successful for the balanced and relatively small size datasets
[16]. Sang Ni et al. [7] created greyscale image files using SimHash bits of
malware. They obtained 0.9926 accuracy on the dataset containing 10, 805
samples, using a CNN classifier. There are many deep learning models
to classify malware types, but we used some of them in the experiment
part of the paper.
CapsNet, as a new CNN structure, has been implemented in 2017 [9],
especially in the health domain [17], CapsNet have many applications
in the literature. For instance, Afshar et al. [18] use CapsNet for brain
tumor classification problems like classification of breast cancer histol-
ogy images of [19]. Mobiny et al. [20] create a fast CapsNet architecture
for lung cancer diagnosis. Another important application area of Cap-
sNet is object segmentation. LaLonde et al. [21] use CapsNet for object
segmentation. Traditional CNN structures, on the other hand, are used
in Generative Adversarial Networks, GANs. CapsNet is very useful to
make GANs better by removing the weakest point of these CNNs [22].
The snippet studies above show that CapsNet is a promising architecture
against the standard CNN. In the literature, although there are many ap-
plications of CapsNets, there is a missing and important area. This area
is a computer and information security. This gap can be seen easily in the
pre-print version of a survey about CapsNets [23].
Another crucial issue in malware classification is imbalanced datasets.
Ebenuwa et al. [24] pointed imbalanced classification problem in bi-
nary classification. They inspected three different techniques, such as
sampling-based, algorithm modifications, and cost-sensitive approaches.
They proposed variance ranking feature selection techniques to get better
results in imbalanced datasets for binary classification problems.
To this end, this paper aims to develop a malware classification model
based on an ensemble of CapsNet architecture for imbalanced malware
datasets, which is the first application of CapsNets in the malware classi-
fication domain.
5
(a) An image example from Family Adi-
aler.
(b) An image example from Family Fak-
erean
Figure 1: Malware image samples obtained from byte files using the algorithm described
in [13].
3. Methodology
3.1. Malware Datasets
There are many open research issues in malware classification. These
issues can be listed such as class imbalance, concept drift, adversarial
learning, interpretability (explainability) of the models, and public bench-
marks [25]. In this paper, our model called RCNF focuses on the class im-
balance issue. Thus, the base CapsNet and the proposed RCNF models
have been tested on two very well-known malware datasets called Mal-
img and Microsoft Malware 2015 (BIG2015). These datasets are highly
imbalanced in terms of the number of classes. This section describes
these datasets.
3.1.1. Malimg
Nataraj et al. introduced a new malware family type classification ap-
proach based on visual analysis, converted binaries into greyscale images
and they published these images as a new malware dataset called Mal-
img [13]. This dataset has 9339 samples and 25 different classes. Table 1
presents the number of samples for each malware family. This distribu-
tion shows that the dataset is highly imbalanced.
Fig. 1 shows the malware images created from the byte files. All
images are single-channel and are resized to 224× 224 for CapsNet ar-
chitecture. This size is the largest value that can be processed in our
computer system.
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Table 1: Sample Distribution for each Malware Family.
No. Family Name Number of Samples
1 Allaple.L 1591
2 Allaple.A 2949
3 Yuner.A 800
4 Lolyda.AA 1 213
5 Lolyda.AA 2 184
6 Lolyda.AA 3 123
7 C2Lop.P 146
8 C2Lop.gen!g 200
9 Instantaccess 431
10 Swizzot.gen!I 132
11 Swizzor.gen!E 128
12 VB.AT 408
13 Fakerean 381
14 Alueron.gen!J 198
15 Malex.gen!J 136
16 Lolyda.AT 159
17 Adialer.C 125
18 Wintrim.BX 97
19 Dialplatform.B 177
20 Dontovo.A 162
21 Obfuscator.AD 142
22 Agent.FYI 116
23 Autorun.K 106
24 Rbot!gen 158
25 Skintrim.N 80
3.1.2. Microsoft Malware 2015 (BIG2015)
BIG2015 dataset has been released as a Kaggle competition [26, 27].
Table 2 presents the sample distribution for each malware family in BIG-
2015 dataset. The distribution shows that the dataset is highly imbal-
anced; and Simda is the toughest malware family to be predicted for the
dataset. The dataset contains 10868 BYTE (bytes) files and 10868 ASM
(assembly code) files and 9 different malware family types. BIG2015, un-
like the Malimg dataset, contains raw files. Thus, a file from the BIG2015
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dataset is opened in the byte mode and then the file is read by 256 sized
chunks till the end of the file. Finally, the buffer is converted to array and
the array is saved as a greyscale image into the file system. All processes
are described in Fig. 2. This method is the most common way to convert
from malware files to images [13, 28].
Figure 2: Flowchart of the process of a flat-file to greyscale image for the BIG2015
dataset.
Fig. 3 depicts image representations created from the BYTE and ASM
files of the same malware sample in Ramnit malware family. All images
are single channel. All images are resized 112 × 112 for our CapsNet
architecture, because the architecture uses both BYTE and ASM image
representations at the same time.
4. Model
In this section, general capsule networks, base CapsNet architecture
for Malimg and base CapsNet architecture for BIG2015 are described.
CapsNet architectures are different for both Malimg and BIG2015 Dataset.
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Table 2: Number of Samples for Each Malware Family in BIG2015 Dataset.
No. Family Name Number of Image
1 Ramnit 1541
2 Lollipop 2478
3 Kelihos ver3 2942
4 Vundo 475
5 Simda 42
6 Tracur 751
7 Kelihos ver1 398
8 Obfuscator.ACY 1228
9 Gatak 1013
4.1. Capsule Networks
Capsule networks are special architectures of convolutional neural
networks aiming to minimize information loss because of max pooling
[9]. This method is the weakest point for preserving spatial information
[19]. A CapsNet contains capsules similar to autoencoders [29, 9]. Each
capsule learns how to represent an instance for a given class. Therefore,
each capsule creates a fixed-length feature vector to be input for a clas-
sifier layer without using max pooling layers in its internal structure. In
this way, this capsule structure aims to preserve texture and spatial infor-
mation with minimum loss.
Sabor et al. propose an efficient method to train CapsNet architectures
[9]. This method is called a dynamic routing algorithm, which uses a
new non-linear activation function called squashing shown in (1). This
equation emphasizes that short vectors are shrunk to almost zero and
long vectors are shrunk to 1 [9]. In this equation, vi is the output of ith
capsule and si shows the total input of this capsule.
vi =
‖si‖2
1+‖si‖2
si
‖si‖ (1)
Visualizing the squash activation function described in (1) is hard be-
cause its input is a high dimensional vector. If the activation function can
be thought of as a single variable function, as described in [30], then the
behavior of the function and its derivative can be visualized, as in Fig. 4.
9
(a) An image example obtained from
BYTE File
in Ramnit Family
(b) An image example obtained from
ASM File
in Ramnit Family
Figure 3: BIG2015 image samples from BYTE and ASM files using the algorithm de-
scribed in [13].
A basic CapsNet architecture contains two parts: the standard convo-
lution blocks and the capsule layer as shown in Fig. 5. A convolution
block is made from a combination of convolution filters and ReLU acti-
vation function. At the end of the convolution block, obtained feature
maps are reshaped and projected to d − dimensional vector representa-
tion. This representation feeds each capsule in the capsule layer. Each
capsule learns how to represent and reconstruct a given sample like an
autoencoder [29] architecture. In order to learn how to reconstruct a mal-
ware sample, the capsule network will minimize reconstruction error in
(2), where xc ∈ Rdxd is the real sample in the capsule c and xˆc ∈ Rdxd is
the reconstructed sample by the same capsule c. These representations
are used to calculate the class probabilities for the classification task.
`r = (xc − xˆc)2 (2)
Margin loss function is used for CapsNet. This function is similar to
hinge loss [31]. (3) defines the margin loss Lc for capsule c,
`m = yc× (max(0, m− yˆc))2 + λ× (1− yc)× (max(0, yˆc− (1−m)))2 (3)
where m = 0.9, λ = 0.5, yc denotes actual class and yˆc represents the
current prediction.
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Figure 4: Squashing activation function and its derivation in 2-D plane.
Lc = `m + 0.0005× `r (4)
L =
1
N
N
∑
n=1
Lc (5)
The mean of Lc for each capsule gives the total loss in (5), where Lc is
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sum of margin loss `m (as described in (3)) and reconstruction loss `r (as
described in (2)). However, reconstruction loss is multiplied by 0.0005 to
avoid suppressing the margin loss [9]. In order to minimize loss L, one
can use the most applicable optimizer algorithm for CapsNet by Adam
[32, 9]. We have observed that CapsNet cannot converge to minimum loss
value with optimizers other than that of Adam. This is obviously an open
issue for CapsNet studies in the future.
In image-based malware family type classification problem, there are
no complex patterns that are easily detected by classical convolutional
neural networks. For this reason, the predictive model must recognize the
pattern of pixel distribution of the image-based malware sample. On the
other hand, CapsNet can learn pixel density distribution of each malware
family. Thus, a CapsNet model can be easily trained from scratch for this
problem, unlike CNNs. This is the most important advantage of using
CapsNet as a base classifier in our proposed model.
Figure 5: Basic CapsNet architecture.
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Our main assumption is that CapsNet architecture will be able to suc-
cessfully classify malware family types using raw pixel values obtained
from malware binary and assembly files. In addition to the main assump-
tion, this paper aims to increase CapsNet malware type classification ar-
chitecture accuracy with the bagging ensemble method.
4.2. Base Capsule Network Model for Malimg Dataset
Before creating an ensemble CapsNet model, the base CapsNet esti-
mator must be built. This architecture depends on the dataset. Thus, base
CapsNet estimator architecture has a single convolution line, as shown in
Fig. 6. The convolutional line contains two sequential blocks; and each
block contains two sequential convolutions and ReLU layers. The first
two convolutional layers have 3 × 3 kernels and 32 filters. The second
two convolutional layers have 3× 3 kernels and 64 filters. Feature maps
are reshaped to 128 feature vectors. At the end of the reshape step, there
is a capsule layer containing 25 capsules; the dimension of each capsule
is 8; and the routing iteration is 3 of the capsule layer. This is the optimal
CapsNet architecture for the Malimg dataset depending on our experi-
ments.
Figure 6: CapsNet architecture for Malimg dataset.
4.3. Base Capsule Network Model for BIG2015 Dataset
The BIG2015 dataset has two different files for each sample. One of
them is a binary file; and the other is an assembly file. Thus, it is possible
to design a CapsNet, which can be fed by two different image inputs at
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the same time. Fig. 7 shows a CapsNet architecture, which has two ex-
actly identical convolution lines. In this architecture, the first two sequen-
tial layers contain 3× 3 kernels and 64 filters. The second two sequential
layers contain 3× 3 kernels and 128 filters.
Figure 7: CapsNet architecture for BIG2015 dataset.
Features extracted from the ASM and BYTE images are concatenated;
and the final feature vector is reshaped to a vector with length 128. For
the next level, as an input, this feature vector feeds to a capsule layer
containing 9 capsules. In this layer, the dimension of each capsule is 8;
and the routing iteration is 3. This hyper-parameter set is optimal for the
base CapsNet estimator for the BIG2015 dataset.
4.4. The Proposed Random CapsNet Forest Model for Inbalanced Datasets
Random CapsNet Forest (RCNF) is an ensemble model, which is in-
spired by the Random Forest algorithm [10]. The basic idea behind RCNF
is to assume identical CapsNet models as weak learners create different
training sets for each model from the original training set using the boot-
strap resampling technique, as shown in Algorithm 1. The training al-
gorithm is a variant of bootstrap aggregating (also known as bagging)
[8] for CapsNet model; and bagging reduces the variance of the model
while increasing robustness of the model [33]. In this paper, bagging is
preferred to create an ensemble of CapsNet instead of boosting [34], be-
cause it is shown that boosting tends to overfit [35]. During the training
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phase, each epoch updates the weights of the CapsNet. Therefore, the
weight of the best model at the end of each epoch is saved according
to the validation score to increase model performance and consistency
against random weight initialization of the CapsNet.
Algorithm 1 Random CapsNet Forest Training Algorithm
1: procedure train(base model, n estimators, trainset, valset, epochs)
2: for i← 1, n estimators do
3: bs trainset← resample(trainset, replacement = True)
4: for e← 1, epochs do
5: base model. f it(bs trainset)
6: val score← get accuracy(base model, valset)
7: if is best score(val score) == True then
8: save weights(base model)
Algorithm 2 Random CapsNet Forest Prediction Algorithm
1: procedure predict(n estimators, testset, numclasses) . Average
Ensembling
2: total preds← zeros like(testset.shape[0], numclasses)
3: for i← 1, n estimators do
4: modeli ← load model weights(i)
5: total preds+ = modeli.predict(testset)
6: preds← total preds/n estimators
7: return argmax(preds) . The final predictions of CapsNet models
The prediction method is described in Algorithm 2. Each weight of
CapsNet model is loaded; and test samples are predicted by the model.
Cumulative predicted probabilities are added onto total preds variable;
and this step is known as average ensembling step. At the end of the
estimation loop, the index of the highest probabilities is assigned as a
predicted class.
There are several limitations to the RCNF model. The first limitation
is the number estimators in the RCNF model. In this implementation,
an RCNF model can contain up to 10 CapsNets because of an increasing
number of trainable parameters. The second limitation is the training
time. Training of an RCNF with 10 CapsNets for the BIG2015 dataset
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takes five hours (100 epochs for each CapsNet). This training time of the
RCNF with 5 CapsNets model for the Malimg dataset is decreasing (100
epochs for each CapsNet). On the other hand, the RCNF can be easily
parallelized to increase efficiency in the training phase. Each CapsNet
can be trained on multiple GPUs. We will develop a distributed multi-
GPU version of the RCNF as a future work.
We implemented the RCNF using Tensorflow (version 1.5) [36] and
Keras [37], Sklearn [38], Numpy [39] and Pandas [40]. All scripts were
written in Python3. The configuration of the computer used in this study
was 12GB GPU (GeForce GTX 1080 Ti) and Intel Core i9-9900K processor
with 64 GB main memory for testing.
5. Experiment and Results
CapsNet and RCNF ensemble models are tested on two different datasets
called Malimg and BIG2015. The Malimg dataset has been divided into
three parts: training, validation, and test sets. The training set has 7004
samples, the validation set has 1167 samples, and the test set has 1167
samples. BIG2015 has also been divided into three parts like the Malimg
dataset. In the experiments of CapsNet and RCNF ensemble model for
the BIG2015 dataset, the training set has 8151 samples, the validation set
has 1359 samples and the test set has 1358 samples. The first experiment
is made to obtain performance results of single base CapsNet estima-
tors for each dataset. The second experiment is about the performance
of the RCNF model. Model evaluation has been done in terms of accu-
racy, F-Score, and the number of parameters of deep neural nets. These
performance metrics are defined as follows:
accuracy =
(TP + TN)
(TP + TN + FP + FN)
(6)
F-Score =
2× TP
2× TP + FN + FP (7)
where true positive (TP) and false positive (FP) are the numbers of in-
stances correctly and wrongly classified as positive respectively. True
negative (TN) and false negative (FN) are the number of instances cor-
rectly and wrongly classified as negative respectively. Accuracy is the
ratio of the number of true predictions to all instances in the set as shown
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in (6). F-Score is shown as the set (7) in terms of true positives, false
negatives, and false positives. Accuracy is not a correct performance met-
ric for imbalanced datasets. On the other hand, papers compared in this
work use accuracy and F-Score performance metrics to measure the suc-
cess of their models. Thus, this paper gives the experiment results in
terms of accuracy and the F-Score. Our main goal is that an ensemble of
the CapsNet can reduce the number of FN and FP in (7).
Fig. 8 shows confusion matrices for each test part of both datasets.
Each confusion matrix (Fig. 8a and 8b) implies that a model contain-
ing single CapsNet incorrectly predicts rare malware families in both
datasets.
Fig. 9 is the confusion matrix of RCNF containing 5 base CapsNet
models. This confusion matrix shows the prediction accuracy of the
model for each malware family type in the Malimg test set. Class 8,
10, 20, and 21 have been predicted wrongly by the RCNF model. On the
other hand, the model has been very successful at correctly predicting
other malware types in the test set. This confusion matrix also shows
that RCNF is successful at correctly predicting rare malware types in the
Malimg test set.
In the second experiment, RCNF is tested on the BIG2015 dataset. Fig.
9 shows the prediction results of RCNF containing 10 base CapsNet for
BIG2015 dataset. Class 4 is the rarest malware type in the whole dataset.
Training, validation, and test sets are stratified, so the class distribution
is preserved for each partition. This result shows that RCNF can pre-
dict the rarest malware type pretty well. Class 0, 1, 2, and 6 are predicted
perfectly by RCNF. If the performance of RCNF is compared with the per-
formance of a single CapsNet model, it is easily seen that RCNF is better
than a single CapsNet at predicting rare malware families for imbalanced
datasets.
Table 3 shows the test performance of the proposed models and others
for the Malimg dataset. Yue [41] uses a weighted loss function to handle
the imbalanced class distribution problem in the Malimg dataset; and also
uses the transfer learning [61] method to classify malware family types.
Due to using transfer learning, the architecture has 20M parameters; and
the model is so huge. Cui et al. [42] use classical machine learning meth-
ods such as K-Nearest Neighbor and support vector machines. They have
trained these algorithms using GIST and GLCM features, which are fea-
ture engineering methods for images; and they have applied resampling
17
(a) Malimg Test Set
(b) BIG2015 Test Set
Figure 8: Confusion Matrices of single CapsNet Model for each test set.
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Figure 9: Confusion Matrix of 5-RCNF for Malimg test set.
Table 3: Comparison RCNF and other methods for Malimg test set performance.
Model Number of Parameters F-Score Accuracy
Yue [41] 20M - 0.9863
Cui et al. [42] - 0.9455 0.9450
Venkatraman et al. [43] 212, 885 0.916 0.963
Vasan et al. [44] 134M 0.9820 0.9827
Vasan et al. [45] 157M 0.9948 0.9950
CapsNet
for
Malimg
90, 592 0.9658 0.9863
RCNF
for
Malimg
5× 90, 592 0.9661 0.9872
to the dataset to solve imbalanced dataset problems. RCNF does not
use a weighted loss function or any sampling method to overcome the
19
Figure 10: Confusion Matrix of 10-RCNF for BIG2015 test set.
imbalanced dataset problem. Our results are higher than these two meth-
ods; and the results also show that CapsNet and RCNF do not require
any method for extra feature engineering in the Malimg dataset. A sin-
gle CapsNet architecture for the Malimg dataset has 90, 592 trainable pa-
rameters and RCNF has 452, 960 trainable parameters, so our proposed
methods are reasonably smaller than Yue’s method. Venkatraman et al.
[43] propose two different models called CNN BiLSTM and CNN BiGRU
with two variants of these models, which are called cost-sensitive and
cost-insensitive. When CNN BiGRU reaches its own highest F-Score and
accuracy on the Malimg dataset, its number of the trainable parameters
is greater than RCNF and its scores are lower than RCNF. In other words,
RCNF reaches the-state-of-the-art scores in terms of F-Score and accuracy
with a lower parameter size.
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Table 4: Comparison RCNF and other methods for BIG2015 test set performance.
Model Number of Parameters F-Score Accuracy
Venkatraman et al. [43] 212, 885 0.725 -
Cao et al. [46] - - 0.95
Gibert et al. [47] - 0.9813 0.9894
Kreuk et al. [48] - - 0.9921
Le et al. [49] 268, 949 0.9605 0.9820
Chen [50] - - 0.9925
Jung et al. [51] 148, 489 - 0.99
Abijah et al. [6] - - 0.9914
Zhao et al. [52] - - 0.929
Khan et al. [53] - - 0.8836
Safa et al. [54] - - 0.9931
Kebede et al. [55] - - 0.9915
Kim et al. [56] - - 0.9266
Kim et al. [57] - 0.8936 0.9697
Yan et al. [58] - - 0.9936
Naeem et al. [59] - 0.971 0.9840
Jang et al. [60] - - 0.9965
CapsNet
for
BIG2015
527, 232 0.9779 0.9926
RCNF
for
BIG2015
10× 527, 232 0.9820 0.9956
IMCFN [44] is an important deep convolutional network for the Mal-
img dataset. When the network is trained from scratch without any data
augmentation, it outperforms our RCNF implementation. IMCFN also
has 126, 727, 705 trainable parameters. When it is compared to RCNF, IM-
CFN is a huge convolutional network. On the other hand, RCNF is more
accurate than IMCFN, but it has a lower F-Score than IMCFN. The most
important advantage of RCNF is using a lower number of parameters,
and this makes RCNF trainable in GPUs with low memory.
IMCEC [45] is one of the most successful an ensemble model of CNN
architectures for the MALIMG in terms of accuracy and F-Score. How-
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ever, IMCEC is more complex than RCNF. IMCEC uses two different
CNN architectures VGG16 [62] and ResNet-50 [63] to use transfer learn-
ing. Although IMCEC is more accurate than RCNF in terms of accuracy
and F-Score, IMCEC has a total of 157M parameters because of using
these CNN networks. Unlike IMCEC, RCNF has 452, 960 trainable pa-
rameters and it is reasonably accurate as much as IMCEC.
Table 4 compares the test performance of the proposed models and
others for the BIG2015 dataset. Venkatraman et al. [43] also test the CNN
BiGRU model on the BIG2015 dataset. In this case, the performance of
the CNN BiGRU model is lower than RCNF, but its number of trainable
parameters are reasonably lower than RCNF. Chen [50] and Khan et al.
[53] use transfer learning architectures for the dataset. Test results of our
proposed methods are better than those two models, but our results are
very close to Chen [50] in terms of accuracy. Our proposed models are
better than Gibert et al. [47] in terms of accuracy, but the F-Score of RCNF
is very close to this model. Our proposed models are better than models
of Cao et al. [46], Zhao et al. [52], Kim et al. [56], and Kim et al. [57]. Jung
et al. [51] propose a reasonably smaller model than our models in terms
of the number of parameters, but our model has a higher accuracy score
than this model. Abijah et al. [6], Safa et al. [54], Kebede et al. [55], and
Yan et al. [58] propose deep learning models whose accuracy scores are
close to our proposed models. In addition to these, Jang et al. [60] report
five different accuracy scores for the BIG2015 dataset and they do not use
F-Score despite the dataset is highly imbalanced. Their accuracy is the
highest one for the dataset, but their network has two complex phases
and uses GAN based data augmentation (they call this method malware
obfuscator). On the other hand, RCNF does not use data augmentation,
data resampling, transfer learning, and weighted loss functions for both
datasets. In this perspective, RCNF is a simple version of an ensemble of
CapsNet, and this simplicity highlights RCNF among its competitors.
For those tables, the last studies using Malimg and BIG2015 datasets
are chosen. To compare them fairly, these models are drawn from image-
based malware analysis studies. These results show that while RCNF
reaches the-state-of-the-art scores in terms of F-Score and accuracy on
the Malimg dataset with less trainable parameter size, it outperforms its
competitors on the BIG2015 with larger size of parameters.
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6. Conclusion
This paper introduces the first application of CapsNet on imbalanced
malware family type classification task. Moreover, the first ensemble
model of CapsNet called RCNF is introduced in this paper. The pro-
posed models do not require any complex feature engineering methods
or architecture for deep networks. To show that, we used two different
malware family type datasets: Malimg and BIG2015. These datasets are
used for image-based malware classification. Our proposed models can
utilize these datasets directly using raw pixel values.
Datasets in the paper are highly imbalanced in terms of class distri-
bution. CapsNet and RCNF do not use oversampling, under sampling,
and weighted loss function during the training phase. Results show that
CapsNet and RCNF are the best models least suffering from imbalanced
class distribution among others in the literature.
Experiment results show that a single CapsNet model has good per-
formance for both BIG2015 and Malimg datasets. However, we have as-
sumed an ensemble model of CapsNet can help us to increase gener-
alization performance and RCNF has better generalization performance
results than a single CapsNet model as expected. In this point, results
show that creating a bagging ensemble model CapsNet increases the per-
formance on predicting rare malware classes. While single CapsNet can
obtain 0.9779 F-Score for the BIG2015 dataset, an ensemble of 10 Cap-
sNets achieves 0.9820 F-Score. We can observe the similar effects on the
Malimg dataset. It is shown that bagging increases the performance of
the CapsNet for imbalanced datasets and the ensemble model is more
successful at predicting rare classes than a single CapsNet model due to
ensembling.
Many models compared in this paper are designed complex and large
in terms of the number of parameters. Some of them use data augmenta-
tion, weighted loss functions, different extra feature engineering methods,
and pre-trained deep neural networks that have large number of param-
eters.
As for future work, we are planning to develop a hybrid architecture
for malware classification. This hybrid method will be based on CapsNet
architecture.
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